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Commonwealth v. Wisneski: A Driver Has a Duty to Stop When He Runs Over a Dead Body

C. Vodzak Case Summaries, Criminal (PA), Pennsylvania Supreme Court Case Summaries 0

Commonwealth v. Wisneski, No. 5 WAP 2010 (September 29, 2011)

Wisneski ran over a fallen bicyclist with his vehicle. Although he realized after looking at his rear view mirror that he had hit a body, and not a speed bump as he originally thought, Wisneski did not stop or notify police. The bicyclist had been struck by more than one vehicle and died.

Wisneski was charged with failure to stop at an accident, failure to comply with a duty to give information and render aid, and failure to immediately notify the police.

He filed a habeas corpus petition seeking dismissal of the charges asserting that the Commonwealth cannot prove that the bicyclist was alive when he struck him. Concluding that the statutes required the victim be alive at the time of the accident, the Indiana County Court of Common Pleas granted Wisneski’s petition, and the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed. The Commonwealth appealed to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.

Because statutory interpretation is a question of law, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court exercised a de novo standard of review.

Section 3742 of Pennsylvania’s Vehicle Code addresses accidents involving death or personal injury:

(a)  General rule.–The driver of any vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury or death of any person shall immediately stop the vehicle at the scene of the accident or as close thereto as possible but shall then forthwith return to and in every event shall remain at the scene of the accident until he has fulfilled the requirements of section 3744 (relating to duty to give information and render aid). Every stop shall be made without obstructing traffic more than is necessary.

Noting that the statute does not define “accident,” the Court concluded that its meaning is broad, and duration cannot be determined. The Court also pointed out that involvement does not require that a person cause the accident.

The Court found that the plain meaning of the word “injury” is also broad. The Court stated that the legislature intended for a person to stop if he damaged someone’s property, such as a bicycle. Therefore, the duty to stop certainly exists if a person damaged someone’s body, whether alive or dead.

Reversing the Superior Court, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that “injury” encompasses damage to a dead body, so all the obligations under the statutes apply even when the victim is deceased.

In Re Kelsey Lauren Miller: A Parent Has the Right to Challenge the Appointment of a Guardian for His Child’s Estate

C. Vodzak Case Summaries, Pennsylvania Supreme Court Case Summaries 0

In Re Kelsey Lauren Miller, No. 9 WAP 2010 (September 29, 2011)

Miller, a child under 14 years of age, was named sole beneficiary of her father’s life insurance policy valued at $356,000.

After Miller’s father died, his sister, who served as administratrix of his estate, petitioned the Beaver County Court of Common Pleas Orphans’ Court as Miller’s “next friend” to appoint her own attorney as the guardian of the child’s estate. Her petition did not include Miller’s mother’s consent or reason why she did not consent as required by Pennsylvania Orphans’ Court Rule 12.5 (b)(3).

Despite Mother’s objections, the court appointed this attorney as limited guardian and directed that the child’s funds be placed into a trust. The petition contained the proposed irrevocable trust agreement in which the attorney was the settlor, Father’s sister was named “Family Trustee,” and a bank was designated “Corporate Trustee.” 

Mother appealed to the Pennsylvania Superior Court, which agreed with the trial court that she lacked standing. She then appealed to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court examined and reaffirmed its 1853 decision in Senseman’s Appeal, a case with a similar fact pattern in which the Court found that a “father had a right to be heard in matters related to an appointment of a limited guardian for his child.” The Court also addressed its 1889 decision in Appeal of Corwin, which held that a petition for the appointment of a guardian for a minor child should not be presented without notice to the parent.

The Court found the express requirements of Orphans’ Court Rule 12.5 consistent with these longstanding cases and contemplated a parent’s involvement and participation in such judicial proceedings.

Turning to the principles of standing, the Court explained that a person has standing only if he is aggrieved, which is demonstrated by showing “a substantial, direct and immediate interest in the proceedings.”

Concluding that Mother met all the requirements for standing, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court remanded the case to the Pennsylvania Superior Court.

Commonwealth v. Hart: The Mere Offer of a Car Ride to a Child Is Not an Attempt to Lure

C. Vodzak Case Summaries, Criminal (PA), Pennsylvania Supreme Court Case Summaries 0

Commonwealth v. Hart, No. 9 MAP 2010 (Pa. September 28, 2011)

Twice in one week, Hart, a 35-year-old man living in a residential area, offered two neighborhood boys a ride to school or at least as far as the local grocery store. Hart neither ordered their entry nor enticed them. The children declined on both occasions.

Hart was then charged with harassment, stalking, and attempted luring of a child into a motor vehicle. After a bench trial in the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas, he was convicted on four counts of attempted luring and sentenced to 18 months’ probation. As a result of his conviction, Hart was required to register as a sex offender for ten years under Pennsylvania’s Megan’s Law.

Hart appealed to the Pennsylvania Superior Court. Relying on its 1994 Commonwealth v. Figueroa decision, the Superior Court affirmed Hart’s conviction. Hart then appealed to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.

Section 2910 of the Pennsylvania Crimes Code addresses luring a child into a motor vehicle:

(a) Offense.–Unless the circumstances reasonably indicate that the child is in need of assistance, a person who lures or attempts to lure a child into a motor vehicle or structure without the consent, express or implied, of the child’s parent or guardian commits a misdemeanor of the first degree.

(b) Affirmative defense.–It shall be an affirmative defense to a prosecution under this section that the person lured or attempted to lure the child into the structure for a lawful purpose.

Because statutory interpretation is a question of law, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court exercised a de novo standard of review.

Noting that neither the current nor previous versions of Section 2910 defined “lure,” the Court first turned to two apparently contradictory 1994 Pennsylvania Superior Court opinions: Commonwealth v. Adamo and Commonwealth v. Figueroa.

In Adamo, the Superior Court found that enticement beyond an offer of a ride to a child is necessary to constitute a lure. But shortly after in Figueroa, it held that an offer of a ride without more was sufficient.

The Court then looked at dictionary definitions of “lure” and concluded that luring requires inducement beyond the mere offer of a ride.

Rejecting Figueroa and concluding that Hart’s actions of offering rides without inducement did not constitute attempts to lure, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed Hart’s conviction.